ROSE: Robust Searchable Encryption With Forward and Backward Security
Peng Xu, Willy Susilo, Wei Wang, Tianyang Chen, Qianhong Wu, Kaitai Liang, Hai Jin · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · 2022
Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) has been widely recognized as a promising technique to delegateupdateandsearchqueries over an outsourced database to an untrusted server while guaranteeing the privacy of data. Many efforts on DSSE have been devoted to obtaining a good tradeoff between security and performance. However, it appears that all existing DSSE works miss studying on what will happen if the DSSE client issues irrationalupdatequeries carelessly, such as duplicateupdatequeries anddeletequeries to remove non-existent entries (that have been considered by many popular database system in the setting of plaintext). In this scenario, we find that (1) most prior works lose their claimed correctness or security, and (2) no single approach can achieve correctness, forward and backward security, and practical performance at the same time. To address this problem, we study for the first time the notion of robustness of DSSE. Generally, we say that a DSSE scheme is robust if it can keep the same correctness and security even in the case of misoperations. Then, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive named key-updatable pseudo-random function and apply this primitive to constructing ROSE, a robust DSSE scheme with forward and backward security. Finally, we demonstrate the efficiency of ROSE and give the experimental comparisons.