A logical theory of coordination and joint ability
Hojjat Ghaderi, Hector J. Levesque, Yves Lespérance · 2007
A team of agents is jointly able to achieve a goal if despite any incomplete knowledge they may have about the world or each other, they still know enough to be able to get to a goal state. Unlike in the single-agent case, the mere exis-tence of a working plan is not enough as there may be several incompatible working plans and the agents may not be able to choose a share that coordinates with those of the others. Some formalizations of joint ability ignore this issue of co-ordination within a coalition. Others, including those based on game theory, deal with coordination, but require a com-plete specification of what the agents believe. Such a com-plete specification is often not available. Here we present a new formalization of joint ability based on logical entailment in the situation calculus that avoids both of these pitfalls.