LEAP: Leakage-Abuse Attack on Efficiently Deployable, Efficiently Searchable Encryption with Partially Known Dataset
Jianting Ning, Xinyi Huang, Geong Sen Poh, Jiaming Yuan, Yingjiu Li, Jian Weng, Robert Huijie Deng · 2021
Searchable Encryption (SE) enables private queries on encrypted documents. Most existing SE schemes focus on constructing industrial-ready, practical solutions at the expense of information leakages that are considered acceptable. In particular, ShadowCrypt utilizes a cryptographic approach named ''efficiently deployable, efficiently searchable encryption'' (EDESE) that reveals the encrypted dataset and the query tokens among other information. However, recent attacks showed that such leakages can be exploited to (partially) recover the underlying keywords of query tokens under certain assumptions on the attacker's background knowledge.