Machine-Learning Side-Channel Attacks on the GALACTICS Constant-Time Implementation of BLISS
Soundes Marzougui, Nils Wisiol, Patrick Gersch, Juliane Krämer, Jean‐Pierre Seifert · Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security · 2022
Due to the advancing development of quantum computers, practical attacks on conventional public-key cryptography may become feasible in the next few decades. To address this risk, post-quantum schemes that are assumed to be secure against quantum attacks are being developed. Lattice-based algorithms are promising replacements for conventional schemes, with BLISS being one of the earliest post-quantum signature schemes in this family. However, required subroutines such as Gaussian sampling have been demonstrated to be a risk for the security of BLISS, since implementing Gaussian sampling both efficient and secure with respect to physical attacks is challenging.