Preserving Liberty and Fairness in Combinatorial Double Auction Games Based on Blockchain
Jung-San Lee, Chit-Jie Chew, Ying-Chin Chen, Kuo‐Jui Wei · IEEE Systems Journal · 2020
An E-auction mechanism has been considered as the most popular activity in E-commerce model. However, it relies on the assumption that a fully trusted third party is required to guarantee the system, which is hard to be implemented in the real-world. In this article, we aim to design an ad-hoc combinatorial double auction framework based on the blockchain technique. The properties of decentralization and nontempering can be used to realize a fair transaction and enhance the flexibility without the third party. A participant can follow his/her will to launch an auction play with the adoption of smart contract, and an improved genetic algorithm is designed to figure out an optimal pairing solution within a reasonable period. Experiments have demonstrated that the new framework can fulfill most transactions to benefit both seller and buyer no matter how many players and commodities have involved into the auction.