Virtual Reality and Ontology
Grant Tavinor · 2021
This chapter addresses metaphysical realism about virtual worlds and objects. Starting from a theoretical account of VR as comprising an egocentric interactive mode of picturing, the discussion deflates the metaphysical issues that dog the analysis of virtual reality itself. The chapter covers several forms of ontological realism. First, is the common claim that there is an ontological spectrum or shift from the perception of the real world to the perception of virtual worlds, and that this shift involves something like the adoption of beliefs in the existence of the latter. Next, are claims that apparent virtual objects have a real existence either as computational or digital objects, or as socially constructed objects of the kind that are common in philosophical accounts of social kinds. Finally, noting the prevalence of such realism about virtual objects, this chapter explores reasons, besides the truth of such claims, for why they might be so common. The error theory for virtual ontological realism presented here argues that if care is not taken to distinguish between the medium of VR picturing and the range of intentional objects arising from its varied use, one can easily become confused about ontological matters.