Proving SIFA protection of masked redundant circuits
Vedad Hadžić, Robert Primas, Roderick Bloem · Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering · 2022
Abstract Implementation attacks like side-channel and fault attacks pose a considerable threat to cryptographic devices that are physically accessible by an attacker. As a consequence, devices like smart cards implement corresponding countermeasures like redundant computation and masking. Recently, statistical ineffective fault attacks (SIFA) have been shown to be able to circumvent these classical countermeasure techniques. We present a new approach for verifying the SIFA protection of arbitrary masked implementations in both hardware and software. The proposed method uses Boolean dependency analysis, factorization, and known properties of masked computations to show whether the fault detection mechanism of redundant masked circuits can leak information about the processed secret values. We implemented this new method in a tool calledDanira, which can show the SIFA resistance of cryptographic implementations like AES S-Boxes within minutes.