An Auction Based Task Dispatching and Pricing Mechanism in Bike-sharing
Yaping Deng, Bing Shi, Han Yuan · 2021
As a green and low-carbon transportation way, bike-sharing provides lots of convenience in the daily life. However, how to dispatch bikes efficiently is a key issue in such a system. The bike-sharing platform can hire workers and pay to incentivize them to accomplish the dispatching tasks. However, there exist multiple workers competing for the dispatching tasks, and they may strategically report their task accomplishing costs (private information known by themselves) in order to make more profits, which may result in inefficient task dispatching. In this paper, we first design a dispatching algorithm named GDY-MAX to allocate tasks to workers. Furthermore, we design a strategy proof mechanism under the budget constraint to allocate tasks and determine the payments to workers. We theoretically prove that our mechanism can satisfy the properties of incentive compatibility, individual rationality and budget balance. Furthermore we run extensive experiments to evaluate our mechanism based on a Mobike dataset. The results show that our approaches can make better performance than benchmark approaches.