A Game Theoretical Pricing Scheme for Vehicles in Vehicular Edge Computing
Chaogang Tang, Chunsheng Zhu, Huaming Wu, Xianglin Wei, Qing Li, Joel J. P. C. Rodrigues · 2020
Vehicular edge computing (VEC) brings the computing resources to the edge of the networks and thus provisions better computing services to the vehicles in terms of response latency. Meanwhile, the edge server can earn their revenues by leasing the computing resources. However, a higher price does not always bring forth more benefits for the edge server in VEC, since it may discourage vehicles from renting more computing resources from VEC. To the best of our knowledge, few of previous works have focused on the real-time pricing problem for VEC. We investigate in this paper the pricing problem from the viewpoints of both vehicles and the edge server, so as to optimize the utility values and revenues of vehicles and the edge server, respectively. We resort to the Stackelberg game for modeling the interactions between vehicles and edge server, and a distributed algorithm for this pricing problem is proposed in the paper. Experimental results have displayed the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.