Enhanced Robustness and Spoofing Resistance by Galileo PRS Processing
Alexander Rügamer, Fabio Garzia, Daniel Meister, J. Rossouw van der Merwe, Simon Taschke, Xabier Zubizarreta, Florian Kunzi, Ricardo Monroy Gonzalez Plata, Santiago Urquijo, Christoph Miksovsky, Wolfgang Felber, Jan Wendel · 2020
This paper presents and discusses some of the enhancements in robustness against jamming and spoofing using unique features of the cryptographically protected Galileo PRS signals. Different techniques exploiting these PRS properties have been implemented and evaluated on the German national PRS test receiver (PROOF). It is shown that the used HDDM interference mitigation method is already as good as the state-of-the-art in high-end GNSS receivers for OS signals. Then the benefits of cryptographically protected signals are discussed with a demonstration how trusted PRS signals can be used to detect and mitigate spoofing attacks also in comparison to one potential Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OS-NMA) configuration.