The Aggregate-Monotonic Core
Pedro Calleja, Carles Rafels, S.H. Tijs · Research portal (Tilburg University) · 2006
The main objective of the paper is to study the locus of all core selec-tion and aggregate monotonic point solutions: the aggregate-monotonic core. Furthermore it is shown that any allocation in this set induces a special core selection and aggregate monotonic point solution. Fur-ther, the aggregate monotonic core is characterized by means of aggregate monotonicity for set solutions. To finish, we determine the class of games for which the core and the aggregate-monotonic core coincide. 1 Introduction. The core of a cooperative TU-game, Gillies (1953, 1959), is one of the most important and intuitive solution concepts. Roughly speaking, the core is the set of feasible outcomes that can not be improve upon by any coalition of players.