Blasphemy, freedom of expression and the role of constitutional rights: the case of Ireland
Neville Cox · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · 2020
In this chapter, and with particular regard to the approach to blasphemy law in the Republic of Ireland, the author argues that a genuine blasphemy law (as distinct from a law that targets blasphemous speech because it has perceived residual consequences) represents a societal statement that speech which treats sacred matters in an inappropriate way is unacceptable. Such a law therefore constitutes an interference with the right to freedom of expression in the name of public morality. The author argues that, as a matter of human rights law, there is nothing objectionable in principle to a law of this kind, provided that it represents a proportionate response to a genuine public morals concern. The example of the Republic of Ireland, where a blasphemy law exists despite the fact that contemporary Irish public morality objects to rather than demands a blasphemy law, demonstrates that it is only where a state’s public morality is religiously based that such a law could be justified. Equally, and because morality is objectively unprovable as being right or wrong, the fact that most Western states now endorse secular, individual focused moral visions does not mean that a public morality grounded in religion is universally unacceptable. Therefore, the fact that a blasphemy law is out of place in a secular society does not mean that it is inherently and universally unacceptable.