DISKSHIELD: A Data Tamper-Resistant Storage for Intel SGX
Jin-Woo Ahn, Junghee Lee, Yungwoo Ko, Donghyun Min, Jiyun Park, Sungyong Park, Youngjae Kim · 2020
With the increasing importance of data, the threat of malware which destroys data has been increasing. If malware acquires the highest software privilege, any attempt to detect and remove malware can be disabled. In this paper, we propose DISKSHIELD, a secure storage framework. DISKSHIELD uses Intel SGX to provide Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to the host, implements the file system into SSD firmware that provides a Trusted Computing Base (TCB), and uses a two-way authentication mechanism to securely transfer data from the host TEE to the SSD TCB against data tampering attacks. This design frees DISKSHIELD from attacks to the kernel. To show the efficacy of DISKSHIELD, we prototyped a DISKSHIELD system by modifying Intel IPFS and developing a device file system on the Jasmine OpenSSD Platform in a Linux environment. Our results show that DISKSHIELD provides strong data tamper resistance the throughput of read and write is on average to 28%, 19% lower than IPFS.