Accessibility and Auditability in Electronic Voting
Ren Bucholz · Information technology and disabilities · 2004
BACKGROUND Nearly one-third of American voters--over 50 million people--live in districts that will use electronic voting (e-voting) terminals to elect the next president (New Study, 2004). In contrast, less than half that number cast an electronic ballot in 2000. This huge increase in e-voting has been embraced by the disability rights community, as these systems could make it possible for many disabled Americans to cast their ballots in secret, without the assistance of another person. However, widespread reports of voting terminal failures (see, e.g., Novak, 2004), and growing concern about the of these machines security (Kohno et al, 2003; Trusted agent, 2004; Risk assessment, 2003), are fueling fierce debate over how to ensure the integrity of our elections. The particular concern about direct recording electronic (DRE) voting terminals is that they can provide no real audit, and their capacity for a recount is essentially nonexistent. If the integrity of a race is called into question, election officials have no recourse but to trust the machine. An important part of this discussion, therefore, has focused on whether and when to equip direct recording electronic (DRE) voting terminals with a voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) (Mercuri, 2002). A VVPAT solves this problem by adding a second record of each vote. Upon completing his/her selections, a voter is presented with a summary both on screen and on a paper printout. If the two records match, both are retained by the machine in the event of a recount. If they do not match, the voter can alert an election official that the machine is malfunctioning. The nation's leading security experts (Resolution, 2004) and a growing popular movement champion the VVPAT, although it is by no means the possible solution. As a result, America is rethinking electronic voting. Seven states now have directives or laws requiring VVPAT, and 14 others have introduced similar legislation (Election reform, 2004). Federal legislators are considering reforms that would mandate a VVPAT for DREs (see, e.g., Holt, 2003). In some election jurisdictions, officials have deferred multi-million dollar DRE purchases (Garvin, 2003) while others are upgrading to non-DRE voting systems. The prospect of complications or delay in DRE deployment has alarmed some members of the disability rights community. That alarm has been fueled by two myths: 1) that VVPAT-enabled DREs do not exist and 2) that DREs can provide voting to people with disabilities. For example, the American Association for People with Disabilities' (AAPD) website states, Touch screen voting systems that provide a [VVPAT] do not exist, have not been tested in the real world, and are not certified (AAPD policy, 2003). Further, a lawsuit filed on behalf of AAPD and others claims that only DRE systems, when properly equipped, are and enable voters who are disabled to vote independently, unassisted and in secret (AAPD v. Shelley, 2004). If taken at face value, these statements imply that the push toward verifiable elections must pull us away from elections. But elections with verifiable results are not an impossibility. In fact, currently available technology can accomplish both objectives. Accessible, auditable, federally qualified machines are available for purchase today, and more are scheduled for release in the coming months. Further, non-DRE methods of voting are also available and in development. OPTIONS FOR AUDITABLE AND ACCESSIBLE VOTING Before discussing accessible voting options, it is important to note the limitations of that term in this context. There are currently no federal standards that set performance levels for accessibility, and the most anecdotal studies have been conducted. However, all of the following technologies attempt to serve disabled voters by some combination of audio interfaces, high-contrast displays, adjustability for wheelchair users, sip/puff interfaces, and other accessibility features. …