Public key encryption and encryption emulation attacks.
Denis Valentinovich Osin, Vladimir Shpilrain · 2008
Abstract. The main purpose of this paper is to show that public key encryption can be secure against the “encryption emulation ” attack (on the sender’s encryption) by computationally unbounded adversary, with one reservation: a legitimate receiver decrypts correctly with probability that can be made arbitrarily close to 1, but not equal to 1. 1. Summary of our claims We thought it would make sense to summarize, for the reader’s convenience, our two main claims in a separate section, before proceeding to a narrative introduction. In Section 3, we describe a public-key encryption protocol that allows Bob (the sender) to send secret information to Alice (the receiver), encrypted one bit at a time, so that: (1) Assuming that Eve (the adversary): (a) is computationally unbounded, (b) knows everything about Bob’s encryption algorithm and hardware, (c) does not know Alice’s algorithm for creating public key, then: she cannot decrypt any single bit correctly with probability> 3 4