Attack on Han et al.'s ID-based Confirmer (Undeniable) Signature at ACM-EC'03.
Fangguo Zhang, Reihaneh Safavi–Naini, Willy Susilo · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · 2003
In ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC'03), Han et al. [Identity-based confirmer signatures from pairings over elliptic curves, in: Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce Citation 2003, San Diego, CA, USA, June 09-12, 2003, pp. 262-263] proposed an ID-based confirmer signature scheme using pairings (the scheme is in fact an ID-based undeniable signature scheme). In this paper, we show that this signature scheme is not secure and the signer can deny any signature, even if it is a valid signature, and any one can forge a valid confirmer signature of a signer with identity ID on an arbitrary message and confirm this signature to the verifier.