A constructionist cognitive model of virtual presence
David Nuñez · 2004
This paper proposes a cognitive model of presence which emphasizes the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes, and the subsequent creation of temporary representations of an environment in working memory. These temporary representations (which we term constructions) are formations of meaning about the environment, which allow a subject to make inferences and interact in that environment. We argue that this constructionist position follows from the existence of hypothesis selection models of presence such as proposed by Slater & Steed. Finally, we contrast our model to that of Wirth et al and discuss some of the implications of this model for presence in unfamiliar or unrealistic environments 1. Cognitive models of presence With the recent move towards a comprehensive theory of presence, cognitive science has surfaced as an important basis for understanding presence. For example [1], in discussing breaks in presence, propose a filtering, information-processing model in which one of two information streams (real environment/virtual environment) is selected for processing. Many other examples of the application of cognitive theory in presence exist- for instance [2] and [3]. Although it is generally accepted that presence is a complex, multi-factor construct, we believe that an understanding of the cognition of virtual environments (and indeed real environments) can lead to invaluable insights into fundamental aspects of presence. Therefore, although this paper presents an exclusively cognitive model of presence, it should be understood as an attempt to