On the Detection of Always-On Hardware Trojans Supported by a Pre-Silicon Verification Methodology
Annachiara Ruospo, Ernesto Sánchez · 2019
Hardware-based vulnerabilities are becoming a serious threat in the Integrated Circuit (IC) industry. Current System-on-Chip (SoC) designs are comprised of many Intellectual Property (IP) blocks coming from third-party vendors. These can maliciously insert additional hardware, commonly known as Hardware Trojans, aiming at degrading performance, altering functionality or even leaking secret information. According to their activation mechanism, Hardware Trojans are classified as triggered or always-on. While the detection approaches for the first class are widely explored even during the early stages of the IC design flow, the detection of always-on type mainly relies on side channel analyses, carried out after fabrication. This work presents a methodology oriented to detect always-on Hardware Trojans during the pre-silicon design stage. The proposed approach is able to detect suspicious intrusions by exploiting a signature mechanism developed during the RTL verification phase. The activity of carefully selected signals is spied to record and keep the state of the core. Finally, the efficacy of the technique has been validated on an open-source IP core with three different always-on Trojans.