Model Agnostic Defence Against Backdoor Attacks in Machine Learning
Sakshi Udeshi, Shanshan Peng, Gerald Woo, Lionell Loh, Louth Rawshan, Sudipta Chattopadhyay · IEEE Transactions on Reliability · 2022
Machine learning (ML) has automated a multitude of our day-to-day decision-making domains, such as education, employment, and driving automation. The continued success of ML largely depends on our ability to trust the model we are using. Recently, a new class of attacks called backdoor attacks have been developed. These attacks undermine the user’s trust in ML models. In this article, we presentNeo, a model agnostic framework to detect and mitigate such backdoor attacks in image classification ML models. For a given image classification model, our approach analyzes the inputs it receives and determines if the model is backdoored. In addition to this feature, we also mitigate these attacks by determining the correct predictions of the poisoned images. We have implementedNeoand evaluated it against three state-of-the-art poisoned models. In our evaluation, we show thatNeocan detect$\approx$88% of the poisoned inputs on average and it is as fast as 4.4 ms per input image. We also compare ourNeoapproach with the state-of-the-art defence methodologies proposed for backdoor attacks. Our evaluation reveals that despite being a blackbox approach,Neois more effective in thwarting backdoor attacks than the existing techniques. Finally, we also reconstruct the exact poisoned input for the user to effectively test their systems.