Weak-Key Leakage Resilient Cryptography.
Zuoxia Yu, Qiuliang Xu, Yongbin Zhou, Chengyu Hu, Rupeng Yang, Guangjun Fan · 2014
In traditional cryptography, the standard way of examining the security of a scheme is to analyze it in a black-box manner, capturing no side channel attacks which exploit various forms of unintended information leakages and do threaten the practical security of the scheme. One way to protect against such attacks aforementioned is to extend the traditional models so as to capture them. Early models rely on the assumption that only computation leaks information, and are incapable of capturing memory attacks such as cold boot attacks. Thus, Akavia et al. (TCC ’09) formalize the general model of key-leakage attacks to cover them. However, most key-leakage attacks in reality tend to be weak key-leakage attacks which can be viewed as a non-adaptive version of the key-leakage attacks. Powerful as those may be, the existing constructions of cryptographic schemes in adaptive key-leakage attacks model still have some drawbacks such as they are quite inefficient or they can only tolerate a small amount of leakage. Therefore, we mainly consider models that cover weak key-leakage attacks and the corresponding constructions in them. We extend the transformation paradigm presented by Naor and Segev that can transform