Automated algebraic analysis of structure-preserving signature schemes
Joeri de Ruiter, J.E.J. de Ruiter · 2014
Structure-preserving signature schemes can be very useful in the construction of new cryp-tographic operations like blind signatures. Recently several of these schemes have been pro-posed. The security of signature-preserving signature schemes is still proved by hand, which can be a laborious task. One of the ways to prove security of these schemes algebraic analysis can be used. We present an approach to perform this analysis and the first tool, CheckSPS, that can do an algebraic security analysis of these schemes, using SMT solvers as backend. This can help in constructing new schemes and analyse existing schemes. Our tool can handle all the common security objectives for signature schemes, i.e. existential unforgeability and strong existential unforgeability, and all the common capabilities for adversaries, i.e. random message attacks, non-adaptive chosen message attacks and adaptive chosen message attacks. The tool is sound, so if an attack is found it is actually possible to construct a forged signature. 1