Eclipse attacks on Bitcoin's peer-to-peer network
Ethan Heilman, Alison Kendler, Aviv Zohar, Sharon Goldberg · 2015
We present eclipse attacks on bitcoin’s peer-to-peer net-work. Our attack allows an adversary controlling a suffi-cient number of IP addresses to monopolize all connec-tions to and from a victim bitcoin node. The attacker can then exploit the victim for attacks on bitcoin’s mining and consensus system, including N-confirmation double spending, selfish mining, and adversarial forks in the blockchain. We take a detailed look at bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network, and quantify the resources involved in our attack via probabilistic analysis, Monte Carlo simu-lations, measurements and experiments with live bitcoin nodes. Finally, we present countermeasures, inspired by botnet architectures, that are designed to raise the bar for eclipse attacks while preserving the openness and decen-tralization of bitcoin’s current network architecture. 1