On secure embedded token design (Long Version) - Quasi-looped Yao circuits and bounded leakage.
Simon Hoerder, Kimmo U. Jarvinen, Daniel Page · 2013
Abstract. Within a broader context of mobile and embedded computing, the design of practical, secure tokens that can store and/or process security-critical information remains an ongoing challenge. One aspect of this challenge is the threat of information leakage through side-channel attacks, which is exacerbated by any resource constraints. Although any countermeasure can be of value, it seems clear that approaches providing robust guarantees are most attractive. Along these lines, this paper extends previous work on use of Yao circuits via two contributions. First, we show how careful analysis can fix the maximum number of traces acquired during a DPA attack, effectively bounding leakage from a Yao-based token: for a low enough bound, the token can therefore be secured via conventional (potentially less robust) countermeasures. To achieve this we use modularised Yao circuits, which also support our second contribution: the first Yao-based implementation of a secure authentication payload, namely HMAC based on SHA-256. Note: The primary version of this paper will be published in the proceedings for the Workshop