XOR based Methodology to Detect Hardware Trojan utilizing the Transition Probability
Anindan Mondal, Mahabub Hasan Mahalat, Anudeep Reddy Medapati, Suchismita Roy, Bibhash Sen · 2018
Hardware Trojan has become a serious security issue in recent times for both integrated chip (IC) industry and government due to the separation of the design phase and manufacturing phase of the IC industrial model. Hardware Trojan is a malicious logic added to a functional system by an adversary with an intention of system malfunction or failure. Due to its stealthy nature, traditional testing algorithms are not sufficient to detect such Trojans. Few attempts have been made for the detection of hardware trojan augmenting extra logic module in design phase inside the main circuit. However, those approaches suffer from various issues such as huge insertion overhead, high time complexity etc. In this context, an efficient methodology by inserting XOR gates inside a netlist is proposed here to detect the presence of Trojan. Experimental result shows that our proposed method achieved significant improvement in terms of number of transitions at possible vulnerable nets while overcoming the limitations of the previous works. Transition probability of the vulnerable nets has increased up to 5 times which is validated by various ISCAS-89 benchmark circuits.