Impact of Man-In-The-Middle Attacks on Ethereum
Parinya Ekparinya, Vincent Gramoli, Guillaume Jourjon · 2018
Recent theoretical attacks conjectured the vulnerabilities of mainstream blockchains through simulations or assumption violations. Unfortunately, previous results typically omit both the nature of the network under which the blockchain code runs and whether blockchains are private, consortium or public. In this paper, we study the public Ethereum blockchain as well as a consortium and private blockchains and quantify the feasibility of man-in-the-middle and double spending attacks against them. To this end, we list important properties of the Ethereum public blockchain topology, we deploy VMs with constrained CPU quantum to mimic the top-10 mining pools of Ethereum and we attack them, by first partitionning the network through BGP hijacking or ARP spooling before issuing a Balance Attack to steal coins. Our results demonstrate that attacking Ethereum is remarkably devastating in a consortium or private context as the adversary can multiply her digital assets by 200, 000× in 10 hours through BGP hijacking whereas it would be almost impossible in a public context.