Two Problems Afflicting the Search for a Standard Model of the Mind
Paul Bello, Selmer Bringsjord · National Conference on Artificial Intelligence · 2017
We describe two serious problems afflicting the search for a standard model of the mind (SMM), as carried out and prescribed by Laird, Lebiere, and Rosenbloom (LLR). The first problem concerns a glaring omission from SMM, while the second calls into question the evidentiary standards for convergence that motivates the entire SMM agenda. It may well be that neither problem is insuperable, even in the short term. On the other hand, both problems currently stand in the way of making any present pronouncements to the effect that a standard model (or substantive portion thereof) exists and can be used as a benchmark against which other researchers might compare their approaches. The pair of problems is offered in a spirit of collaboration, and in the hope that grappling with them will help move the search a bit closer to the sort of undisputed rigor and predictive power afforded by such models in physics. Our order of business in the sequel is straightforward: we present and briefly discuss each of the two problems in turn, and wrap up with some remarks regarding whether or not these problems can be surmounted, and if so, how. In what follows, we argue that even on the most liberal identification of the term “mind” with a project in defining a consensus view of cognitive architecture, consciousness remains a deeply conspicuous omission that flirts with rendering the project incoherent. We open with a rough-and-ready discussion of how consciousness is often characterized in information-processing terms, and its most plausible correlate in LLR’s proposed SMM.We show that the introductionof consciousness as a phenomena to be accounted for reveals fault-lines between architectures that are claimed by LLR to be similar enough to warrant the postulation of the SMM. We then consider and rebut a range of objections to both the general requirement of accounting for consciousness within the SMM and to the specifics of our argument. The analysis we offer with respect to consciousness is diagnostic of what we see as a far more insidious and difficult problemto remedy, which will be explored in the second part of this paper.