Countering Double-Spending in Next-Generation Blockchains
Muhammad Saad, Aziz Mohaisen, Charles Kamhoua, Kevin Kwait, Laurent Njilla · Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research · 2018
In this paper, we look at the use of hash-based, one-time signatures in the context of the Blockchain systems and demonstrate how the replacement of currently utilized schemes into a one-time signature can help deter double-spending. Towards this goal, we make the following contributions. 1) We introduce a notion of double- spending deterrence, a form of malleability that does not require pre-authorization from the signer to create a signature on an arbitrary message using two previously signed messages. It is used as a penalty to deter double-spending and disincentivize forgery. 2) We study features of various one-time signature schemes, and we demonstrate their effectiveness in thwarting double-spending. 3) We explore the design space of applying our methodology to the Blockchain system with a clear example and design options to deter double-spending. The results reported in this paper are promising, and open several new directions.