Towards incentive compatible auction mechanism for electric vehicles bidding in microgrids
Yi Zhao, Jia Xian, Qingyu Yang, Donghe Li, Dou An · 2018
In this paper, we address the issue of Electric Vehicles (EVs) bidding at charging stations in Microgrids. EVs bidding issues have attracted growing attentions recently, as the increasing integration of EVs and the shortage of energy supply. Auction mechanisms have great potential to facilitate energy trading among EVs and charging station in an efficient and fair manner. Nevertheless, two essential problems are challenging when designing auction mechanisms in EVs charging market, i) a feasible auction mechanism should satisfy the property of incentive compatibility which ensure that the bidders could achieve highest utility if and only if submitting truthful bids and asks; ii) a robust auction mechanism should also prevent the auction results from being manipulated by the adversaries false-name bidding attacks, where the adversaries create multiple identities to compromise the auction results. To address the above challenges, we investigate a multi-round incentive compatible (MuRIC) auction mechanism to enable energy trading among EVs owners (buyers) and charging station (seller). Through theoretical analysis, we prove that MuRIC achieves properties of individual rationality, incentive compatibility and false-name proofness. The simulation results show that MuRIC achieves good performance regarding to buyers/seller satisfaction ratio and the winners distributions.