Sensor CON-Fusion
Shoei Nashimoto, Daisuke Suzuki, Takeshi Sugawara, Kazuo Sakiyama · 2018
In recent years, information systems have become increasingly able to interact with the real world by using relatively cheap connected embedded devices. In such systems, sensors are crucial components because systems can observe the real world only through sensors. Recently, there have been emerging threats to sensors, which involve the injection of false information in the physical/analog domain. To counter such attacks, sensor fusion is considered a promising approach because the robustness of a measurement can be improved by combining data from redundant sensors. However, sensor fusion algorithms were not originally designed to consider security, and thus their effectiveness is unclear. For this reason, in this paper, we evaluate in detail the security of sensor fusion. Notably, we consider a sensor fusion scenario that involves measuring inclination, with a combination of an accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer using Kalman filter. Based on a theoretical analysis of the algorithm, two concrete attacks that defeat the sensor fusion are proposed. The feasibility of the proposed attacks is verified by performing experiments in emulated and real environments. We also propose a countermeasure that thwarts the new attacks. Furthermore, we logically prove that the proposed countermeasure detects all possible attacks.