On the Very Idea of Metalinguistic Theories of Names
Aidan Gray · Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · 2018
Metalinguistic approaches to names hold that proper names are semantically associated with name-bearing properties.I argue that metalinguistic theorists owe us an account of the metaphysics of those properties.The unique structure of the debate about names gives an issue which might look to be narrowly linguistic an important metaphysical dimension.The only plausible account of name-bearing treats name-bearing properties as a species of response-dependent property.I outline how such an account should look, drawing on forms of response-dependence identified in the literature on colour, moral properties, etc.Having done that, I show how the account can illuminate a feature of the communicative function of names which would otherwise be puzzling from the perspective of metalinguistic accounts.1.In a sense, 'metalinguistic' is not a great term here, insofar as it might be taken to suggest that these views treat names as somehow quotative of other, more basic, expressions.This is clearly not what theorists have in mind.I stick with 'metalinguistic' to mark the fact that these theorists gloss the properties expressed by names in terms of linguistic idioms: being called, being given a name, being dubbed, etc. 2.For a picture of names which is both non-homonymous and non-metalinguistic, see Delgado (2016).For a view of names which is homonymous but still metalinguistic, see Garcia-Carpintero (in press).3.