A game of timing with detection uncertainty
Paul L. Muench, David Bednarz, Nicholas A. Krupansky · 2018
Mobility and terrain are two sides of the same coin. I cannot speak to my mobility unless I describe the terrain's ability to thwart my maneuver. Game theory describes the interactions of rational players who behave strategically. In previous work we described the interactions between a mobility player, who is trying to maximize the chances that he makes it from point A to point B with one chance to refuel, and a terrain player who is trying to minimize that probability by placing an obstacle somewhere along the path from A to B. In this paper, we add the twist that the mobility player cannot use their resource until they detect the terrain player. This relates to the literature of games of incomplete information, and can be thought of as a more realistic model of this interaction. In this paper we generalize the game of timing studied in the previous paper to include the possibility that one of the players has imperfect ability to detect his adversary.