Incentive mechanism design for participatory sensing: Considering task quality and users' effort
Yeting Lin, Zhonghui Chen, Xinxin Feng, Haifeng Zheng, Yiwen Xu · 2017
Participatory sensing is the concept of recruiting mobile devices to collect data and engage computing. However, there are many problems in this mode of cooperation, poor quality of received information caused by task executors has been one of them. So incentive mechanism is proposed for attracting users to participate in and submit high-quality data. Inspired by contract theory, we model participatory sensing as a contractual relationship and design rewards for multiple results depending on the quality requirement of tasks which maximize the benefit of task publisher. Under complete information scenario where task executors' efforts can be observed and incomplete information scenario where task executors' efforts cannot be observed, we obtain optional contract for task executors respectively through solving maximization problem. Finally, we evaluate our contract based approach by thorough simulations to show its effectiveness and accuracy and analyze the influence of result, cost and probability on reward from aspects of theory and reality.