Onion-AE: Foundations of Nested Encryption
Phillip Rogaway, Yusi Zhang · Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies · 2018
Abstract Nested symmetric encryption is a well-known technique for low-latency communication privacy. But just what problem does this technique aim to solve? In answer, we provide a provable-security treatment foronion authenticated-encryption(onion-AE). Extending the conventional notion for authenticated-encryption, we demand indistinguishability from random bits and time-of-exit authenticity verification. We show that the encryption technique presently used in Tor does not satisfy our definition of onion-AE security, but that a construction by Mathewson (2012), based on a strong, tweakable, wideblock PRP, does do the job. We go on to discuss three extensions of onion-AE, giving definitions to handle inbound flows, immediate detection of authenticity errors, and corrupt ORs.