A zero-sum mitigation game model for distributed denial of service attack using linear programming
Emmanuel Chimuebuka Amadi, G. E. Eheduru, F. U. Eze, Charles Ikerionwu, Harrison Obiora Amuji · 2017 IEEE 3rd International Conference on Electro-Technology for National Development (NIGERCON) · 2017
The concept of game theory has found application in security and is usually called security games. Game theory has been used over the years in areas involving competition such as marketing, auction, gambling etc. This paper proposes a Linear programming model for solving a game problem that involves the interaction of an attacker (zombie) and a defender (firewall) during a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS). In a DDoS attack scenario, the players (zombie and firewall) are competing for greater share of a resource of the network. An attack occurs when the zombies flood the link in such a way that legitimate users are denied access to a target resource on the network. This paper presents a zero-sum game model solved using linear programming that provides the best strategy for the defender by reducing rogue packets that seek to flood the bandwidth of the network. Our model is validated using defined numbers in the pay-off matrix. Solving the matrix using the model approach shows that both the row and the column sum equal one. The output of the model presents probabilistic values that are related to specific actions to be taken by the defender.