Path Hopping
Reihaneh Safavi–Naini, Alireza Poostindouz, Viliam Lisý · 2017
Moving target defense (MTD) strategies have been widely studied for securing computer communication systems. We consider using MTD strategies as a cryptographic mechanism for providing secure communication when the adversary has access to a quantum computer and security is required over a long period of time. We assume Alice and Bob are connected by multiple disjoint paths, not all of which can be eavesdropped by the attacker at the same time. We propose a cryptographic system that uses an MTD strategy that achieves long-term quantum-safe security. We model the system as a Markov chain, and propose two security measures that correspond to two types of adversaries, called risk-taking and risk-averse. Our numerical simulations shows dependencies between system parameters, and leads to new insights, such as quantifying the cost of being a risk-averse adversary.