In Defense of Two Intentionalism-Defeating Inverted Spectrum Thought Experiments
Pendaran Roberts · IRL - University of Missouri, St. Louis (University of Missouri–St. Louis) · 2010
Inverted spectrum thought experiments have often been used to argue against Intentionalism. Eric Marcus, in his article entitled “Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum,” defends two versions of Intentionalism, which he calls Intentionalism and Converse Intentionalism, from four inverted-spectrum based arguments. Marcus labels the four arguments from which he defends Intentionalism the implausible error, symmetry, no-inference, and best theory of representation arguments. In this article, I will bolster the arguments from no-inference and symmetry in order that they avoid Marcus’ defenses. Specifically, I will first show that the argument from no-inference may be modified to comply with Marcus’ additional condition on veridical perception, and thus that the argument refutes both versions of Intentionalism. I will, then, show that the argument from symmetry may be modified in such a way that it rests on a successful analogy, and thus that the argument refutes Converse Intentionalism.