Specification and verification of security in reconfigurable scan networks
Michael A. Kochte, Matthias Sauer, Laura Rodríguez Gómez, Pascal Raiola, Bernd Becker, Hans-Joachim Wunderlich · 2017
A large amount of on-chip infrastructure, such as design-for-test, debug, monitoring, or calibration, is required for the efficient manufacturing, debug, and operation of complex hardware systems. The access to such infrastructure poses severe system safety and security threats since it may constitute a side-channel exposing internal state, sensitive data, or IP to attackers. Reconfigurable scan networks (RSNs) have been proposed as a scalable and flexible scan-based access mechanism to on-chip infrastructure. The increasing number and variety of integrated infrastructure as well as diverse access constraints over the system lifetime demand for systematic methods for the specification and formal verification of access protection and security properties in RSNs. This work presents a novel method to specify and verify fine-grained access permissions and restrictions to instruments attached to an RSN. The permissions and restrictions are transformed into predicates that are added to a formal model of a given RSN to prove which access properties hold or do not hold.