Incentivizing the Biased Requesters: Truthful Task Assignment Mechanisms in Crowdsourcing
Jia Hao Xu, Hui Li, Yanxu Li, Dejun Yang, Tao Li · 2017
Crowdsourcing has become an effective tool to utilize human intelligence to perform tasks that are challenging for machines. In the integrated crowdsourcing systems, the requesters are non- monopolistic and may show preferences over the workers. We are the first to design the incentive mechanisms, which consider the issue of stimulating the biased requesters in the competing crowdsourcing market. In this paper, we explore truthful task assignment mechanisms to maximize the total value of accomplished tasks for this new scenario. We present three models of crowdsourcing, which take the preferences of the requesters and the workload constraints of the workers into consideration. We design a task assignment mechanism, which follows the matching approach to solve the Valuation Maximizing Assignment (VMA) problem for each of the three models. Through both rigorous theoretical analyses and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed assignment mechanisms achieve computational efficiency, workload feasibility, preference (universal) truthfulness and constant approximation.