Side Channel Analysis Research Framework (SCARF)
Greg Mefford · OhioLink ETD Center (Ohio Library and Information Network) · 2012
Getting started in the research of side-channel information leakage from cryptographic systems is difficult and time-consuming.In addition to the time spent learning about the various mechanisms through which information can be leaked and the metrics used to quantify and analyze the leakage, the researcher must develop tools to collect the necessary data and process it in a standard way in order to compare results across multiple experiments.The Side-Channel Analysis Research Framework (SCARF) is presented as a solution to the complexities of designing a software infrastructure capable of managing both simulation and measurement data to produce relevant metrics and plots relating to cryptographic side-channel analysis research.SCARF consists of a software framework built on top of the Ruby programming language and using the open-source Redis database as an efficient in-memory object store.It is distributed with fully-working example code to demonstrate its use in side-channel analysis attacks against a simplified version of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and against a physical implementation of Microchip's KeeLoq R technology [13], often used in remote keyless-entry applications for vehicles and garage door openers.Through the implementation of multiple example attacks, we demonstrate SCARF as a useful tool for researching and comparing side-channel attacks on both physical and proposed cryptographic hardware.