Key Exchange in IPsec revisited: Formal Analysis of IKEv1 and IKEv2
Cas J. F. Cremers · Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) · 2011
The IPsec standard aims to provide application-transparent end-to-end security for the Internet Protocol. The security properties of IPsec critically depend on the underlying key exchange protocols, known as IKE (Internet Key Exchange). We provide the most extensive formal analysis so far of the current IKE versions, IKEv1 and IKEv2. We combine recently introduced formal anal ysis methods for security protocols with massive parallelization, allowing the scope of our analysis to go far beyond previous formal analysis. While we do not find any significant weaknesses on the secrecy of the session keys established by IKE, we find several previously unreported weaknesses on the authentication properties of IKE.