Attacking the Network Time Protocol
Aanchal Malhotra, Isaac E. Cohen, Erik Brakke, Sharon Goldberg · 2016
We explore the risk that network attackers can exploit unauthenticated Network Time Protocol (NTP) traffic to alter the time on client systems.We first discuss how an onpath attacker, that hijacks traffic to an NTP server, can quickly shift time on the server's clients.Then, we present an extremely low-rate (single packet) denial-of-service attack that an off-path attacker, located anywhere on the network, can use to disable NTP clock synchronization on a client.Next, we show how an off-path attacker can exploit IPv4 packet fragmentation to dramatically shift time on a client.We discuss the implications of these attacks on other core Internet protocols, quantify their attack surface using Internet measurements, and suggest a few simple countermeasures that can improve the security of NTP.