Wittgenstein and Antirealism
Mathieu Marion · 2016
Mathematics is one of the many domains where the adoption of a form of realism has traditionally been challenged. Behaviorism and phenomenalism, opposed to realism about, respectively, mental entities and the existence of material objects, are other well-known examples. The realism debate, as initiated by Dummett's challenge, appears to have run its course, at least on its original terms, and difficulties have been raised with respect to both antirealist and anti-antirealist readings of Wittgenstein within that debate. Realism about meaning did not remain unchallenged, however, as successor debates took its place, surrounding Robert Brandom's “inferentialism” or Price's generalized form of quasi-realism, called “pragmatism”. Brandom also espouses “non-representationalism” and predictably made use of Wittgenstein, with a reading akin to Kripke's of the rule-following argument. He was criticized by McDowell largely for failing to account for Wittgenstein's quietism.