Comparison of side-channel attack on cryptographic cirucits between old and new technology FPGAs
Yu Nomata, Masato Matsubayashi, Kohei Sawada, Akashi Satoh · 2016
SASEBO and SAKURA, boards developed for physical security analysis of cryptographic circuits against side-channel attacks, are FPGAs of different generations. The attacks perform statistical analysis on power or electromagnetic waveforms, and enhance leakage signals caused by a secret key. However, the signal becomes weaker along with the advancing miniaturization and high integration of semiconductor process technology. In this paper, power and electro-magnetic attacks against AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) circuits on the FPGA boards are conducted. Then, it is demonstrated that the amplitude of the signal is not dominant, but S/N ration defined as "power related to the secret key / power of other circuit activities" is important.