eTegrity and ePunchScan
David Chaum, Stefan Popoveniuc, Poorvi L. Vora · 2009
We examine the problem of an electronic end-to-end voting system that does not require paper. As a first step, we define two protocols based on the end-to-end protocols of Scantegrity and PunchScan respectively. Using either protocol, the voter votes on an electronic voting machine in a polling booth. We also assume the voter may bring with him a (personally trusted) voter computing device that aids him in ensuring his vote is recorded correctly; this device performs checks equivalent to the ballot audits and commitment checks performed in the Scantegrity and PunchScan protocols. We assume that the computing device does not collude with the voting system to change the tally, but can, on the other hand, be inspected by a coercer who wishes to determine if the voter followed instructions. (The voter may, for example, bring with him a SmartPhone programmed by a public interest organization trusted by him.) We informally examine the security properties of the systems based on these protocols.