Verification and Detection of a Wireless-Leakage Hardware Trojan Horse with Covert Channels
Yancang Chen, Ying Zhou, Pei Wei, Sai Sui, Yaxin Zhao, Minlei Zhang, Lunguo Xie · 2016
Hardware Trojan horses have become a troublesome challenge for security-sensitive integrated circuits.As one important categorization, the carrier of wireless-leakage hardware Trojan horse is radio wave, bypassed protective isolation equipment, such as traditional firewall.Even if no networking, it can also works, therefore more devilishness.This paper design a wireless-leakage hardware Trojan horse with Spartan-3E FPGA, which can pass system sensitive information to outside device with wireless radio signal by common pins, and the signals can be received by simple radios.Experimental results show that, a simple radio can receive the signal emitted by the hardware Trojan horse when their distance is more the 30 meters without any holdbacks.We also present a detection method and some defense suggestions.