I-logic: An intensional logic of informations
Stephen R. Bond, Marc Denecker · Lirias · 2007
In many AI contexts, such as natural language processing, sensing, and multi-agent systems, it is desirable to represent the information in a sentence in a formal and unambiguous way - in other words, to treat the intension of a sentence as a unique formal object. Standard intensional logics, which use a Kripke-style semantics, cannot do this, because Kripke structures do not contain enough worlds to ensure that different informations are represented by different sets of worlds. In this paper we present I-logic, a formal language in which the information in a sentence can be uniquely and unambiguously represented. I-logic. which is based on a subset of Montague's Intensional logic, has an information semantics that evaluates intensions over all possible worlds. We define I-Iogic and its semantics, and show by example that it can capture the information in a sentence uniquely and unambiguously.