Editorial: On the Security of the First Leakage-Free Certificateless Signcryption Scheme

Xi-Jun Lin, Lin Sun, Haipeng Qu, Xiaoshuai Zhang · The Computer Journal · 2016

Recently, Islam and Li proposed the first certificateless signcryption scheme without ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack, called leakage-free certificateless signcryption (leakage-free CLSC) scheme. However, we point out in this paper that the confidentiality property is not captured in their proposal. Moreover, our attack adheres to the security model proposed in the original paper. On the other hand, the security models proposed by Islam and Li are insufficient. In fact, the ESL attack is not involved in the security models since the ephemeral secret is not returned to the adversary when CLSC-Signcryption query and Challenge are issued. Finally, we give the amended security models.

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