Unwrapping the Chrysalis
Mike Bond, Daniel Cvrček, Steven J. Murdoch · 2021
We describe our experiences reverse engineering the Chrysalis-ITS Luna CA³ – a PKCS#11 compliant cryptographic token. Emissions analysis and security API attacks are viewed by many to be simpler and more efficient than a direct attack on an HSM. But how difficult is it to actually “go in the front door”? We describe how we unpicked the CA³ internal architecture and abused its low-level API to impersonate a CA³ token in its cloning protocol – and extract PKCS#11 private keys in the clear. We quantify the effort involved in developing and applying the skills necessary for such a reverse-engineering attack. In the process, we discover that the Luna CA³ has far more undocumented code and functionality than is revealed to the end-user.