What are Dispositional Properties?
Matthew Tugby · Oxford University Press eBooks · 2016
Few contemporary metaphysicians deny that things have dispositional properties. But there remains an underexplored debate about the precise metaphysical status of dispositional properties. According to dispositional realism, dispositions are grounded in sui generis universals or tropes. In contrast, causal nominalism proposes that dispositional properties are sets of entities with primitive functional or subjunctive features in common. This chapter critically compares dispositional realism and this new nominalist rival. After defending causal nominalism against some preliminary objections, it argues that dispositional realism is nonetheless to be preferred on explanatory grounds. On the causal nominalist picture, individuals have no intrinsic nature. This makes it difficult to explain why individuals have the dispositions they have and why certain dispositions tend to cluster together in the way they do. In contrast, dispositional realism is able to do this explanatory work.