Lessons in Philosophy of Logic from Medieval Obligationes
Catarina Dutilh Novaes · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · 2012
There are only a handful of periods in the history of logic matching the level of activity and sophistication of the last 150 years. One of them is the Latin later medieval tradition, roughly ranging from the 12th century to the end of the 14th century (although interesting developments continued to take place later on). In this period, a remarkable collection of logical theories was developed in addition to the traditional Aristotelian logical framework. One could say that the four main contributions of Latin medieval logicians are: theories of the properties of terms, in particular theories of supposition (being close in spirit to the modern enterprise of formal semantics—see Dutilh Novaes (forthcoming), Read (2006)); the insolubilia literature on Liar-like and other paradoxes (see Dutilh Novaes (2008), Spade & Read (2009)); theories of consequence, forerunning modern discussions on logical consequence (see Read (2009)); and theories of obligationes.1 At first sight, it might seem that obligationes is the most obscure item of this list, and the least related to modern concerns and interests. But closer inspection reveals that, perhaps precisely because of its apparent strangeness and remoteness, there is much insight to be gained from medieval obligationes that could shed new light on current debates in the philosophy of logic. This is indeed what I attempt to show in this paper.